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When the United States ratified the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees' (Protocol), it undertook not to "expel or return
(refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of terri-
tories where his life or freedom would be threatened" on specified
grounds.2 On May 24, 1992, President Bush issued an executive order,
known as the Kennebunkport Order, authorizing the United' States
Coast Guard to interdict vessels on the high seas suspected of contain-
ing Haitians destined for U.S. shores and to return such persons to
Haiti without regard to whether their lives or freedom would be
threatened on the grounds specified in the Protocol.' The Coast Guard
thereupon began intercepting such vessels and returning their passen-
gers to Haiti without inquiring whether they would be persecuted there.
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., Columbia; B.A.,
Yale. I have addressed the issues that are the subject of this article in amicus curiae briefs filed
over the years in various cases. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, No. 92-344; Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); Brief of Amici Curiae, The Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, American Immigration Law Foundation, and Center for Human Rights and Constitu-
tional Law, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (1 1th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1245 (1992); Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae, The International Human Rights Law Group,
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Brief of Amicus Curiae, The
International Human Rights Law Group, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Graccy, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). I benefited enormously from discussions with co-counsel in those cases, particularly
Roberts B. Owen, 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Arthur Helton, and Andrew I. Schoenholtz.
1. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
2. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Article 33]. Under Article 1(1) of the 1967 Protocol, the United States has
agreed to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention. The United States had not become
party to the Convention itself because the Convention was primarily designed to address the post-
war refugee problem in Europe. See S. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 9 (1968) (statement
of Lawrence A. Dawson, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, De-
partment of State).
3. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). The order provides that "the Attor-
ney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be
returned without his consent." Id. at § 2(c)(3). The order does not, however, prohibit the return of
such refugees, unlike the 1981 Reagan executive order which was superseded by the Ken-
nebunkport Order and which specifically provided that no refugee was to be returned without his
consent. Exec. Order No. 12,324, §§ 2(c)(1) and (3), 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). According to
the government, the Kennebunkport Order "embodied" President Bush's conclusion "that all in-
terdictees should be repatriated directly to Haiti." Brief for Petitioners at 7, McNary v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (No. 92-344).
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When this policy was challenged in Haitian Centers Council v. Mc-
Nary,4 the Bush Administration responded in two ways to the argu-
ment that the policy violates the United States' obligations under the
Protocol. First, the government took the position that the policy does
not in fact violate the Protocol. It argued that the Protocol prohibits
the United States from returning refugees to their persecutors if the
refugee is present within our territory, but does not prohibit us from
reaching out beyond our territorial waters to intercept refugees on the
high seas to turn them over to their persecutors.5 Second, the govern-
ment argued that, even if the Protocol's nonrefoulement obligation does
apply to refugees on the high seas, the treaty cannot be enforced by the
courts of this country because it is not "self-executing." 6 Unlike the
first argument, the second does not attempt to defend the policy's legal-
ity. Instead, it denies the Protocol's judicial enforceability. This Article
examines the government's second argument.7
The Haitian interdiction policy was challenged in McNary not only
as a violation of the Protocol, but also as a violation of the Refugee Act
of 1980, which, like the Protocol, prohibits the "return" of any refugee
to a place where he would be persecuted." The district court in McNary
held that the Refugee Act did not apply to refugees on the high seas. 9
It then considered whether the policy violated the Protocol. The court
affirmed that Article 33 "imposes a mandatory duty upon contracting
states such as the United States not to return refugees to countries in
which they face political persecution." 10 The court nevertheless denied
4. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert.granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992)(No. 92-344).
5. Defendants' Opposition to the Entry of Injunctive Relief at 19-24, Haitian Ctrs. Council v.
McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); Brief for Appellees at 37-51, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary,
969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344). Brief for
Petitioners at 36-51, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (No. 92-344).
6. Brief for Defendants, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June
9, 1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); Brief for Appellees,
Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344).
7. Candidate Clinton described the Bush Administration policy of returning Haitians to Haiti
without a hearing "brutal" and concluded that the Second Circuit was "right" when it held that
the policy was illegal. Clinton Statement on Appeals Court Ruling on Haitian Repatriation, U.S.
Newswire, July 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. President-elect Clinton
reaffirmed that his position "has been pretty clear all along": "I think we should have a process in
which these Haitians get a chance to make their case. I think that the blanket sending them back
to Haiti under the circumstances which have prevailed for the last year was an error and so I will
modify that process." Excerpts From President-Elect's News Conference in Arkansas, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 13, 1992, at A18. President Clinton, however, decided to continue the Bush policy at
least temporarily.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
9. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92-Civ. 1258, slip op. at 8 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992),
rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
10. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258, slip op. at 6. This conclusion is in accord with the plain text of
Article 33 and with the decisions of the Supreme Court. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 429 (1987) (The Convention "imposed a mandatory duty on contracting States not to return
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the requested relief because it believed that it was constrained by the
Second Circuit's decision in Bertrand v. Sava," which the court read
as holding that "the Protocol's provisions are not self-executing." 1" The
court recognized that this ruling rendered Article 33 "a cruel hoax...
not worth the paper it is printed on,"" and it invited the Second Cir-
cuit to reconsider its decision in Bertrand. The Second Circuit had no
occasion to consider the self-execution issue, however, as it held that
the Refugee Act does prohibit the government from intercepting refu-
gees on the high seas and returning them to their persecutors. 14 The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari.15
If the Supreme Court affirms the Second Circuit's statutory holding,
it will be unnecessary for it to consider whether Article 33 imposes the
same prohibition and is self-executing. The self-executing character of
Article 33 also need not be addressed if the Supreme Court accepts the
government's argument that Article 33's nonrefoulement obligation
does not apply with respect to refugees who have not yet reached our
shores. 6 Because the self-execution issue arises only if Article 33 ap-
plies to refugees on the high seas but the Refugee Act does not, this
Article proceeds from those assumptions.
I. BACKGROUND: THE "CONFOUNDING" DOCTRINE OF SELF-
EXECUTING TREATIES
That Article 33 is enforceable in United States courts appears to
follow from the plain language of the Constitution and of Article 33
itself. Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause,
declares that all treaties made under the authority of the United States
are the "supreme Law of the Land" and instructs the courts to give
them effect. The Protocol is a treaty of the United States. Article 33
sets forth in unambiguous terms the obligation not to return refugees to
their persecutors. These two provisions appear on their face to require
the courts to enforce the nonrefoulement obligation in cases properly
before them.1 7
an alien to a country where his 'life or freedom would be threatened' on account of one of the
enumerated reasons.") (footnote omitted); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429 n.22 (1984) ("Article
33 gave the refugee an entitlement to avoid deportation to a country in which his life or freedom
would be threatened.").
11. 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258, slip op. at 7.
13. Id.
14. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1357-66 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344).
15. 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344).
16. On this issue, see Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting Persecutors: The Seizure
and Return of Haitian Refugees in Violation of the U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol, 7
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 67 (1993).
17. Whether the case is properly before the court may, of course, turn on such matters as
whether the court has been given jurisdiction over the subject matter and whether the plaintiffs
19931
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 41 1993
42 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
Notwithstanding these provisions, the government argued in McNary
that Article 33 is unenforceable in the courts because the article is not
self-executing. The lower courts have long considered the doctrine of
self-executing treaties to be "one of the most confounding doctrines in
treaty law." 18 The courts and commentators appear to agree that a
non-self-executing treaty is one that must be "implemented" by legisla-
tion before it may be applied by the courts. There is no consensus, how-
ever, on just why legislation is necessary-that is, on just what it is
that a non-self-executing treaty fails to accomplish ex proprio vigore.
Courts have, at various times, addressed the "self-execution" question
as if it concerned (a) whether the treaty itself has the force of domestic
law (or instead requires legislation to give it such force); (b) whether
the treaty itself imposes on the defendant the obligation the plaintiff is
seeking to enforce (or instead contemplates that the obligation will be
imposed in the future through domestic legislation); (c) whether the
obligation the treaty imposes is spelled out clearly enough in the treaty
itself to be amenable to judicial enforcement (or must instead be
fleshed out by Congress before it may be enforced by the courts); and
(d) whether the treaty itself confers a private right of action (or must
instead be supplemented by legislation before it may be enforced in a
private suit).
The label "self-executing" can properly be used to describe a treaty
that, of its own force, has any of the foregoing effects. As applied to
statutory and constitutional provisions, it is understood that the term
does not describe a fixed legal attribute of a law, but instead denotes
that the provision accomplishes some legal end itself.19 The meaning of
the statement that a particular law is or is not "self-executing" turns
entirely on what the end is that the speaker has in mind. When the
term is used to describe a constitutional or statutory provision, the
speaker will usually specify the respect in which the provision is or is
not self-executing. With respect to treaties, however, the term has pro-
have a right of action. These questions do not concern the enforceability vel non of the obligation,
however. If a particular court does not have jurisdiction, the obligation may be enforceable in
another court. And even if a particular plaintiff does not have a right of action, the obligation may
be enforceable by someone who does have a right of action or by a litigant invoking the obligation
defensively. The government did not argue in McNary that the federal court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The government did argue that the plaintiffs
lacked a right of action. The plaintiffs argued in turn that their right of action was conferred by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). On this question, see infra section V.
18. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
19. Thus, the dormant commerce clause is sometimes described as self-executing because it
itself preempts state regulation, see, e.g., Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477
U.S. 1, 7 (1986), and the takings clause has been described as self-executing because it itself
confers a remedy for its violation, see, e.g., First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 305 (1987). See generally Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1120-21 (1992).
[Vol. 7:39
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duced confusion because it has mistakenly been thought to be a term of
art that describes a distinct attribute that a treaty must possess before
it may be applied by the courts. In reality, the term has been used by
the courts (albeit not self-consciously) to describe as wide a variety of
attributes of treaty provisions as of statutory and constitutional
provisions.20
The government in McNary attempted to perpetuate and exploit the
lower courts' confusion by appearing to maintain that the self-execu-
tion issue concerns a distinct attribute of treaties, while manifesting in
different parts of its submissions different understandings of just what
it is that the "doctrine" addresses."' But its submissions also ultimately
recognized what commentators have been saying for some time: that
the terms "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" do not describe a
fixed legal attribute of treaties and analytically are virtually useless
and potentially very confusing.22 The government argued that, when
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) described the Protocol as
self-executing in In re Dunar,23 it meant only that the Protocol of its
own force established an obligation to enact legislation prohibiting the
return of refugees to a place where they would be persecuted. 2' Al-
though this is perhaps the least likely sense in which a court would use
20. Failure to recognize the diversity of concepts to which the "self-executing" label may refer
produces confusion, for example, when one court holds that a treaty is not self-executing because
it does not itself confer a cause of action and a later court applies that precedent to dismiss a
treaty claim in a case in which the litigant does not rely on the treaty as the source of his cause of
action. This is the mistake the government asked the court to make in McNary when, relying on
Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), it asked the court to dismiss on the ground
that the Protocol does not itself confer a cause of action and is therefore not self-executing. In
Tel-Oren, plaintiff relied on a treaty in a suit for damages, and, because a damages remedy was
conferred by no other law, the court quite properly considered whether the treaty itself conferred
a cause of action for damages. It concluded that the treaty did not, and it described the treaty as
not self-executing for that reason. The respondents in McNary, however, do not rely on the Proto-
col as the basis of their cause of action. They rely on the APA. If the APA confers a cause of
action, it is irrelevant whether the treaty itself confers one. See infra Section V.
21. For example, in the very same sentence, the government suggested to the district court in
McNary that Article 33 is not self-executing because it is not itself effective as domestic law and
because it does not confer a cause of action. See Defendants' Opposition to the Entry of Injunctive
Relief at 26, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992)
("There is no indication that the United States intended by its acceptance of the Protocol to
incorporate Article 33 into domestic law as a private cause of action."). As discussed below, these
are distinct issues.
22. See Vdzquez, supra note 19, at 1082, 1120-21; Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2383 (1991); Myres McDougal, Remarks, 45 PRoc. AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 102 (1951) [hereinafter Remarks]; Myres McDougal, The Impact of International Law
upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 25, 77 (1959) ("The
words self-executing and non-self-executing embrace neither intrinsic nor historic meaning nor
magic to resolve the issue."); Jordan Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 783
& n.132 (1988).
23. 14 1. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
24. See Defendants' Opposition to the Entry of Injunctive Relief at 29, Haitian Ctrs. Council
v. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992); rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). Brief for the Appellants at 28, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949
F.2d 1109 (1 1th Cir. 1991)(No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
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the term,2" it is true that, as a matter of standard English usage, the
term may be understood in that sense. In attempting to explain away
the BIA's statement in In re Dunar, the government thus demonstrated
that the term "[is] essentiafly meaningless, and . . . the quicker we
drop it from our vocabulary the better for clarity and understanding. '2 6
The government's discussion of In re Dunar shows that, in the gov-
ernment's view, a treaty may be unenforceable in domestic courts even
if it is "self-executing" in certain respects. The gist of its discussion of
In re Dunar is that, while Article 33 may be self-executing in some
respects, it is not self-executing in the relevant respect. Unfortunately,
the government is vague about what the relevant respect is. Different
portions of its submissions in McNary seem to ascribe different defi-
ciencies to Article 33. Cumulatively, however, they reveal that the gov-
ernment believes that Article 33 is non-self-executing in each of the
four respects listed above. Below, I address in turn each of the deficien-
cies that the government appears to ascribe to Article 33. I show that
Article 33 is the law of the land, that Article 33 itself imposes an obli-
gation on the government not to deliver refugees into the hands of their
persecutors, and that this obligation is perfectly susceptible to judicial
enforcement. Additionally, I show that a treaty may be enforceable in
the courts even if it does not itself confer a private right of action.
II. THE PROTOCOL IS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
The Supremacy Clause declares that "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." 2 The Protocol is a treaty, valid and in
force, made under the authority of the United States. It follows that
the Protocol is the supreme law of the land, and thus has the force of
domestic, as well as international, law.
Despite the clarity and force of the foregoing syllogism, the govern-
ment has argued that the Protocol does not have domestic legal force.28
25. The government's construction results in perhaps the greatest attenuation between the
treaty provision and its ultimate object. The connection could be more attenuated only if the
treaty delegated to another body the obligation to require the United States to enact legislation
that would prohibit the return of refugees to a country in which they would be persecuted.
26. Remarks, supra note 22, at 102. Just as the, government dismisses In re Dunar, I attach
little weight to lower court decisions that state in a conclusory way that the Protocol or Article 33
is not self-executing. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989); Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affid on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). Because the judicial decisions addressing the self-executing character of Article 33 are
unusually conclusory or ill-reasoned, I primarily address in this Article the arguments advanced
by the government on this question during the McNary litigation and in an earlier case raising the
issue, Haitian Refugee Ctr, v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1245 (1992).
27. U.S. CONST. art VI, c1. 2.
28. See Opposition Brief at 35, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d
[Vol. 7:39
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This rather bold position is based on the notion that treaties that are
not "self-executing" are not the law of the land. 9 Such treaties, ac-
cording to the government, may impose international obligations on the
United States, but those international obligations do not have the force
of domestic law. 0 This notion has been combined by certain courts
with the idea that a treaty's self-executing character is largely a matter
of intent, to produce the conclusion that a treaty is the law of the land
only if the United States treaty-makers intended that it be the law of
the land.31 As applied to the Protocol, this analysis accepts that the
Protocol might establish an international obligation not to deliver refu-
gees to their persecutors, but it maintains that this obligation does not
have the force of domestic law unless the President and/or the Senate
so intended.
If the United States Constitution did not include the Supremacy
Clause, all treaties would have the force of law internationally but not
domestically. That is the rule in Great Britain today, 2 and it was the
rule there at the time of our independence. In that country, no treaty
can be applied by domestic law-applying officials, such as judges. They
must instead be executed by Parliament, whose laws are in turn en-
Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344) ("No evidence suggests that
the United States intended by its acceptance of the Protocol to incorporate Article 33 into domes-
tic law .. "); Defendant's Opposition to the Entry of Injunctive Relief at 26, Haitian Ctrs.
Council v. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992) ("There is no indication that the
United States intended by its acceptance of the Protocol to incorporate Article 33 into domestic
law as a private cause of action."). See also Appellants Reply Brief at 8, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991)(No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992)("[Treaties] may impose obligations under international law on the United States as a
contracting party without themselves creating obligations under domestic law. ). Defendants'
Memorandum Opposing Injunctive Relief at 30, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp.
1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(No. 91-2653) ("[T]he statement and actions of the executive and Congress
provide the best indication of whether Article 33 was intended to become part of domestic law
directly, without implementing legislation."); id. at 32 ("Had Article 33 of the Protocol been
viewed as self-executing, that provision itself would have been domestic law .. ").
29. This idea finds its genesis in a negative inference from a statement in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) discussed infra notes 63-76 and accom-
panying text.
30. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 8, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th
Cir. 1991)(No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
31. This was essentially the reasoning of the court in United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1978), on which the government relied in McNary and in
Baker. See Brief for Appellees at 35, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d
Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344); Defendants' Opposition to
the Entry of Injunctive Relief at 26, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258
(E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992);
Reply Brief for Appellants at 8, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th Cir.
1991)(No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Reply Brief for Appellants at 24-26,
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 19, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1919)(No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); De-
fendants' Memorandum Opposing Injunctive Relief, at 29-30, 34, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker,
789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(No. 91-2653).
32. See O'Higgins & Dublin, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 279, 301 (1960).
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forced by domestic law-applying officials. This is so regardless of the
treaty's terms. For example, even if a treaty purported itself to set a
tariff at a given level, domestic law-applying officials would collect the
tariff as set by prior statutes until Parliament executed the treaty by
amending the earlier statute.33
This, however, is the rule that the Framers of our Constitution re-
jected when they adopted the Supremacy Clause. By declaring treaties
to be laws, the clause gives treaties domestic legal force and thus
makes them directly enforceable by domestic law-applying officials
(such as judges) without the need for execution by domestic law-mak-
ing officials (i.e., Congress).
The government concedes that some treaties may have the force of
domestic law, and may thus be applied by the courts without legislative
"execution." But it contends that treaties have domestic legal force
only if the treaty-makers so intend. In the absence of such an intent,
the treaty is not "self-executing," and the British rule prevails.3 4 This
position, however, cannot be squared with the text of the Supremacy
Clause. The government in effect would 'interpret the Supremacy
Clause as a power-conferring provision: the clause, as so interpreted,
would give the treaty-makers the power to make treaties the law of the
land. But that is not what the clause says. The Constitution gives the
treaty-makers the power to make treaties, but the Supremacy Clause
by its terms gives the treaties they make automatic domestic legal
force. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause purports to give domestic legal
force to "all" treaties of the United States. A power-conferring inter-
pretation of the clause is incompatible with the clause's statement that
"all" such treaties "shall be" the law of the land.
The power-conferring interpretation of the clause is also unsupported
by the available evidence of the Framers' intent in adopting the
Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause was the mechanism
adopted by the Framers to secure compliance by the United States
with its treaty obligations." Before the adoption of the Constitution,
state officials (including judges) were adhering to the British rule. They
acknowledged that the United States had an international obligation to
comply with its treaties, but they understood their duty as law-applying
officials to be to enforce the existing state laws, even if they conflicted
with treaty obligations, until those laws were modified or amended by
the state legislatures.36 The lack of a mechanism for deterring or cor-
33. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 274-75 (1795) (Iredell, Circuit Justice). Justice
Iredell's judgment on Circuit was reversed by the Court because he had interpreted the treaty too
narrowly.
34. See supra note 28.
35. See generally Vdzquez, supra note 19, at 1102.
36. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 277.
[Vol. 7:39
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recting violations of treaties by government officials was among the de-
ficiencies of the Articles of Confederation that most concerned the
Framers.
37
There was a consensus at the Convention that the new Constitution
should include an effective mechanism for correcting treaty violations.
Two principal schemes were considered. Under the Virginia plan, Con-
gress was to have the power to "negative" state laws that conflicted
with the nation's treaty obligations.3 8 Under this plan, treaties would
not themselves have superseded pre-existing domestic laws once rati-
fied. The Virginia plan instead addressed the treaty-violation problem
by giving the federal legislature the power to repeal state laws that
conflicted with treaty obligations. This scheme would have retained the
British rule, but instead of relying on the state legislatures to repeal
conflicting state laws, it would have given that responsibility to the fed-
eral legislature.
This scheme .was ultimately rejected in favor of the New Jersey
plan's scheme. Under the latter plan, treaties themselves were given the
force of law through the Supremacy Clause.3" The treaties themselves
were declared to be laws, and thus themselves operated to amend or
repeal inconsistent laws without action by the legislatures of either the
state or federal governments. The state courts were specifically in-
structed to give effect to treaties as law, and the federal courts were
given jurisdiction over cases "arising under" treaties to ensure that the
state courts complied with this directive. The scheme that was adopted
thus gave the courts, rather than the legislatures, the first-line responsi-
bility of enforcing the nation's treaties insofar as they related to
individuals.40
This scheme was not uncontroversial. There were objections to giving
treaties the force of law but excluding from the treaty-making process
37. Vizquez, supra note 19, at 1102.
38. See id. at 1104-06.
39. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 27-29 (rev.
ed. 1966).
40. The Supreme Court in a recent decision observed that the New Jersey plan differed from
the Virginia plan in that the latter contemplated that Congress's legislation would operate directly
on individuals, whereas the former contemplated that Congress's legislation would operate on the
states, which would then have been responsible for executing Congress's directives through legis-
lation. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2421-23 (1992). According to the Court, the
Framers rejected the New Jersey plan in this regard in favor of the Virginia plan. Under the
Court's analysis in New York v. United States, the operation of federal statutes under the New
Jersey plan would have resembled the operation of treaties under the British rule: neither would
have operated on individuals; both would have required legislative implementation. The accuracy
of the Court's description of the New Jersey plan in this regard may be debated. See I FARRAND,
supra note 39, at 251, where Patterson, who proposed the New Jersey plan, noted that his plan,
like the Virginia plan, authorizes Congress to legislate directly over individuals. In any event, with
respect to treaties, it is clear that it was the New Jersey plan, through the Supremacy Clause, that
contemplated direct application to individuals, while the Virginia plan, as originally proposed,
contemplated that treaties would not themselves operate as law upon individuals but instead would
require legislative implementation. See Vdzquez, supra note 19, at 1104-06.
19931
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 47 1993
48 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
the most representative house of the federal legislature. Gouverneur
Morris noted this anomaly and proposed correcting it by giving the
House a role in the making of treaties.41 Madison responded that it
would be inconvenient to give such a role to as numerous a body as the
House, as secrecy and dispatch were indispensable in treaty-making."'
Morris responded that he was not disposed to make treaty-making too
easy: the greater the difficulty of making treaties, Morris stated, the
more seriously they will be taken.43 Thus, the proposal for addressing
this anomaly-i.e., that treaties were laws not made by the legisla-
ture-was defended on the ground that it would advance the
Supremacy Clause's purpose of maximizing treaty compliance." No
one suggested correcting the anomaly by adopting the British rule,
which would have permitted one body to make treaties but another to
give them domestic legal force. Such a rule would have compromised
the Supremacy Clause's purpose of maximizing treaty compliance by
increasing the likelihood that treaties would bind us internationally but
not be judicially enforceable domestically. This is, of course, what the
power-conferring interpretation of the Supremacy Clause would
accomplish.
There were also proposals to carve out categories of treaties that
could be made only with the House's involvement. Madison proposed
giving the House a role in the making of "[t]reaties eventual or of alli-
ance." 45 Additionally, there were proposals for requiring the concur-
rence of less than two-thirds of the Senate for the making of certain
categories of treaties."' Ultimately, all proposals that would have drawn
distinctions among treaties were rejected. The Supremacy Clause's ref-
erence to "all" treaties thus cannot be said to have been inadvertent.
In short, the available evidence of the Framers' intent fails to sup-
port the power-conferring version of the self-execution doctrine. Even
though some Framers were troubled by the fact that treaties were laws
not made by the legislature, no one proposed addressing this. problem
by retaining the British rule, which would have permitted the making
of treaties that lacked domestic legal force pending legislative imple-
mentation. Instead, the Framers adopted a provision that automatically
gave treaties domestic legal force. Moreover, all proposals for drawing
distinctions among treaties were rejected. History thus undermines the
power-conferring theory and fully supports the Supremacy Clause's
plain text: "all" treaties, once ratified, are the "supreme Law of the
41. Id. at 392.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 393.
44. Ultimately, Morris's proposal was rejected, primarily because of the perceived need for
secrecy in the negotiation of treaties. Id. at 394.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 540, 547-49.
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Land."
The proponents of the power-conferring version of the self-execution
doctrine do not rely on the Supremacy Clause's text or history. They
rely instead on dicta from Supreme Court decisions seeming to suggest
that treaties that are not self-executing are not the law of the land,
along with language suggesting that whether or not a treaty is self-
executing is a matter of intent. As discussed in the next section, how-
ever, the Supreme Court's cases do not support the radical departure
from the Supremacy Clause's text that the power-conferring theory
would work. Rather, they establish merely that a treaty must await
congressional action before it may be enforced in court if the obligation
the United States undertook in entering into the treaty was an obliga-
tion to accomplish certain ends through legislation. This version of the
self-execution doctrine is far less problematic from a textual standpoint
than is the power-conferring theory. It does not produce the facial dis-
crepancy between our international obligations and our domestic law
that the latter would produce; it merely recognizes that when the par-
ties have committed themselves to accomplishing certain ends in the
future through domestic law-making, the obligation is addressed to our
domestic law-making institution, Congress. That is very different from
accepting, as the government asked the court in McNary to do, that the
United States when it ratified the Protocol undertook an immediately
effective, clearly defined obligation not to return refugees to a place of
persecution, but that the obligation lacks the force of domestic law, and
thus may not be applied by domestic law-applying officials (such as
judges), because the President and the Senate did not manifest an in-
tention that it have the force of domestic law. The President and the
Senate need not have formulated any intent on that issue. The
Supremacy Clause itself, by its terms, makes the Protocol the "su-
preme Law of the Land." Indeed, the Supreme Court's most recent
treaty decision, rejecting the earlier dicta upon which the proponents of
the power-conferring theory rely, confirms that the "self-execution"
question does not concern the treaty's status as "law of the land," and
rejects the notion that a non-self-executing treaty lacks the force of
domestic law.47
There are, to be sure, circumstances in which a treaty that is valid
and in force internationally does not have the force of domestic law,
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause. For example, if a treaty vio-
lates other provisions of the Constitution, or purports to do what is be-
yond the scope of the treaty-making power, it is not the law of the land
47. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992) ("The Extradition
Treaty has the force of law, and if, as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that
a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual ... ").
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for the same reason an unconstitutional statute is not the law of the
land, even though the treaty may have force internationally. 48 In addi-
tion, if a subsequently enacted statute or a subsequently ratified treaty
conflicts with an earlier treaty, the later statute or treaty supersedes the
earlier treaty as law of the land, even though the earlier treaty might
continue to bind us internationally.' 9
It may well be that the President and Senate have the power to ter-
minate a treaty's domestic legal force even without entering into a later
treaty.50 If so, it may well follow that the President and Senate have
the power affirmatively to countermand the Supremacy Clause's ordi-
nary effect with respect to a particular treaty at the time of the treaty's
ratification. 51 Recognizing this power, however, would do far less vio-
lence to the Supremacy Clause than acceptance of the power-confer-
ring theory would. The Supremacy Clause would remain the rule, and
it would take an affirmative act of the treaty-makers to reverse it with
respect to a particular treaty. But to go further and accept the govern-
ment's argument that a treaty lacks domestic legal force unless the
treaty-makers have affirmatively demonstrated an intention to give it
domestic legal force would require such a radical departure from the
clause's terms that the interpretation must be rejected, if only on tex-
tual grounds.
It is unnecessary to consider here whether the treaty-makers have
the power to deprive a treaty of its domestic legal force by affirmative
act at the time of ratification, such as by expressing an intention that
the treaty not have domestic legal force. There is no evidence that the
treaty-makers entertained any such intent with respect to Article 33.
Indeed, the statements that the government cited in McNary to show
such an intent establish the opposite.
The government recognized in McNary that Article 33 prohibited
the United States from doing certain things that the Attorney General
had discretion to do under then-existing statutes.52 As the Supreme
48. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 137-156 (1972).
49. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190. 195 (1888); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870).
50. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1974)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. The President and Senate purported to do this when they attached to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by
the U.N. Dec. 10, 1984, Hein's No. Kav 2398, a declaration to the effect that the treaty was not
"self-executing," by which they meant that the treaty lacked domestic legal force. S REP. No. 30,
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990).
On the validity of such a declaration, compare Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott,
The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHICAGO-
KENT L. REV. 571 (1991), and Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty
Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEx. L. REV. 233 (1979), with Louis Henkin, The Treaty
Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Power Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1151 (1956).
52. See Brief for Appellees at 33-34 n.20., Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350
(2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344).
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Court observed in Stevic, "the most significant difference" between Ar-
ticle 33 and the text of existing immigration laws was that the former
"gave the refugee an entitlement to avoid deportation to a country in
which his life or freedom would be threatened," whereas the latter
"merely provided the Attorney General with the discretion to grant
withholding of deportation on grounds of persecution."5 As the Su-
preme Court observed in Stevic, despite the acknowledged difference
between Article 33 and the statutory text, it was understood at the
time of our accession that "no amendment of the existing statutory lan-
guage was necessary" because it was contemplated that the Attorney
General would thenceforth "implement" and "honor the requirements
of" Article 33 without legislative action.54 This, of course, is fully con-
sistent with the conclusion that Article 33 was itself effective as domes-
tic law. It was unnecessary to amend the statute giving the Attorney
General discretion to turn refugees over to their persecutors because
Article 33 itself, as law of the land, limited the Attorney General's
discretion. If, as the Supreme Court said in Stevic, Article 33 gave
refugees a "right" and "entitlement" not to be delivered by the United
States to their persecutors, and existing domestic law did not give them
that right or entitlement, and if, as the government argued in McNary,
Article 33 did not have the force of domestic law, then amendment of
existing statutes would have been required. In light of the acknowl-
edged differences between the treaty and the statute, the statement
that no amendment of the statute was required must have been a rec-
ognition that Article 33 itself had domestic legal force and superseded
the inconsistent provisions of the immigration law. To reach any other
conclusion would be to accuse our treaty-makers of having no intention
to grant to refugees the "right" and "entitlement" that Article 33 re-
quired us to provide them. The Court should be slow to attribute such
bad faith to our treaty-makers. 55
The government in McNary relied on the Supreme Court's statement
in Stevie that, notwithstanding the difference between the dictates of
Article 33 and the language of existing statutes, "the Attorney General
could naturally accommodate the Protocol simply by exercising his dis-
53. 467 U.S. at 428-29 n.22.
54. Id. at 429-30.
55. Cf. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884):
Aside from the duty imposed by the Constitution to respect treaty stipulations when they
become the subject of judicial proceedings, the court cannot be unmindful of the fact, that
the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in every inquiry
whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be recognized and protected. And it would
be wanting in proper respect for the. intelligence and patriotism of a co-ordinate depart-
ment of government were it to doubt, for a moment, that these considerations were present
in the minds of its members when the legislation in question was enacted.
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cretion to grant such relief in each case in which the required showing
was. made, and hence no amendment of the existing statutory language
was necessary."56 According to the government, "Itihis passage clearly
indicates that if the Attorney General had been unable to accommo-
date the Protocol under the INA's provisions as then written, an
'amendment' of those provisions would have been 'necessary' for aliens
to obtain relief." 7 This, however, reads far too much into the Supreme
Court's footnote.58 To be sure, Article 33, as law of the land, would
have superseded any existing statute that required the Attorney Gen-
eral to deliver refugees to their persecutors. No amendment of such a
statute would have been "necessary" to enable the Attorney General to
disregard the statute. Nevertheless, an amendment may have been con-
sidered "necessary" to eliminate the confusion that might have been
generated by a facial discrepancy between the law as written and the
Protocol.
Indeed, Congress subsequently did amend the immigration statutes
to make it clear that the Attorney General did not have the discretion
to deliver refugees to their persecutors. As the House Judiciary Com-
mittee Report states, and as the Supreme Court made clear in Stevic,
this change was made "for the sake of clarity."59 These statements
show that the President and Senate understood that Article 33 itself
had domestic legal force. The amendment to the statute, which re-
moved the discretion that the statute appeared to give the Attorney
General, could have "clarified" existing law only if Article 33 itself
served to limit the discretion that the Attorney General enjoyed before
accession to the Protocol."0 Article 33 could have had this effect only if
56. Brief for Appellees at 33-34 n.20, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d
Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344) (quoting Stevic, 467 U.S. at
429 n.22) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 34 n.20.
58. The government's argument that the Ninth Circuit followed this tortured line of reasoning
in Aguilar when it relied on Stevic for the proposition that Article 33 was not self-executing is
unconvincing. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 751 (1991). Citing footnote 22 of Stevic, the Ninth Circuit said in Aguilar that "the Protocol"
was not self-executing. It did not refer to any particular provision. The court was apparently
relying on the Supreme Court's statement in footnote 22 of Stevic that Article 34 is "precatory
and not self-executing." The Ninth Circuit thus made a common error: it assumed that if one
provision of a treaty is not self-executing, none is. The settled rule, however, is that one provision
of a treaty may be self-executing while others are not. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § Il l cmt. h (1987).
59. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429 (1984); HR. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18
(1979)(emphasis added). See also Brief for Appellees at 36, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary,
969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344) (noting
that Congress "clariflied]" the statute when it amended it in 1980).
60. For this reason, the government's statement that "Congress's subsequent efforts in 1980 to
clarify 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) to conform its language to that of the Protocol . . . is irreconcilable
with the notion that the Protocol had independent domestic force" is baffling. Brief for Appellees
at 36, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344). The amendment could have "clarified" existing law only if the
Attorney General's discretion had been limited before then. The Supreme Court's statement that
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it had the force of domestic law. 1
In sum, Article 33 is the law of the land by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause. There is no requirement that the President and Senate "in-
tend" that a treaty be the law of the land: the Supremacy Clause dis-
penses with the need for any such intent. The power-conferring inter-
pretation of the Supremacy Clause is incompatible with the clause's
text and unsupported by either history or case law. It is unnecessary to
consider whether the President and the Senate have the power affirma-
tively to countermand the Supremacy Clause with respect to a particu-
lar treaty upon ratification, for there is no evidence that the President
and the Senate intended to do any such thing upon acceding to the
Protocol. The Supreme Court in Stevic examined the statements on
which the government relied in McNary and concluded that the Proto-
col had the effect of limiting the discretion that executive officials pre-
viously enjoyed to deliver refugees to their persecutors. If the Refugee
Act is indeed territorially limited in its scope, as the government ar-
gues, and if Article 33 is not so limited, as the district court in McNary
found, then Article 33, as "supreme Law of the Land," itself limits the
government's discretion to deliver refugees to their persecutors.
III. ARTICLE 33 DOES NOT REQUIRE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION
Although the Supreme Court recognized early on that the
Supremacy Clause dispensed 'with the need for legislative action to give
treaties domestic legal force,6" it also recognized that certain treaties
may nevertheless not be applied by the courts before implementing leg-
islation has been enacted. Such treaties have become known as "non-
self-executing" treaties. The distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties has its source in the Supreme Court's deci-
the amendment was made "for the sake of clarity" thus establishes that Article 33 itself limited
the Attorney General's discretion.
61. The government in MeNary also relied on statements to the effect that "[alccession to the
Protocol would not impinge adversely upon established practices under existing laws in the United
States." S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. III (1968) (message from Pres. Johnson), cited in Brief
for Appellees at 36 n.21, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350(2d Cir.)(No. 92-
6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344). See also S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
VII, VIII (report of Secretary of State Rusk); S. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); id.
at 2 (Sen. Comm. report); 114 CONG. REC. 29,391 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mansfield). That is
merely a statement that it was not then established practice to intercept refugees on the high seas
and return them to the persecuting nation. The statements to the effect that "refugees in the
United States have long enjoyed the protection and the rights which the Protocol calls for," S.
REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968) (testimony of State Department official) quoted in
Brief for Appellees at 36 n.21, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.)(No. 92-
6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No. 92-344) mean only that "the President and the
Senate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with existing law." Stevic, 467 U.S. at
417. They do not support the conclusion that, to the extent of any differences, the President and
Senate intended that the Protocol not have domestic legal force. The statements discussed in the
text establish the contrary.
62. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1795).
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sion in Foster v. Neilson,63 the only case in which the Supreme Court
has denied relief to an individual on the ground that the treaty on
which he relied was not self-executing." Although the government
would interpret Foster as a virtual resuscitation of the British rule,
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion shows that the category of "non-self-
executing" treaty he recognized is quite limited in scope and does not
embrace Article 33. The Supreme Court did not deny that all treaties
were the law of the land; it merely recognized that, if the obligation
established by the treaty is an obligation to accomplish certain ends
through legislation, the obligation must be performed by Congress, In
other words, the Supreme Court held that the rule that legislation is
not required is one that may be reversed by affirmative agreement of
the parties to the treaty.
Marshall began the relevant portion of the Foster opinion by describ-
ing the domestic effect of treaties in countries that do not have a
Supremacy Clause:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to
be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-territo-
rial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the
respective parties to the instrument.6 5
The government in McNary cited lower court decisions that, in its
view, read this language as establishing "a general presumption" that
treaties may not be enforced in court by individuals.66 In reality, this
language merely restates the British rule. In the sentences that immedi-
ately follow in Foster, the Supreme Court made it clear that this rule
was rejected by the Framers when they adopted the Supremacy Clause,
which establishes the opposite rule in our country:
In the United States, a different principle is established. Our con-
63. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
64. With the possible exception of the cryptic discussion in Cameron Septic Tank Co. v.
Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 50 (1913).
65. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
66. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum Opposing Injunctive Relief 28, Haitian Refugee Ctr.
v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(No. 91-2653); Brief for Appellees 34-35, Haitian
Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144) cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992)(No. 92-344), which cite Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th
Cir. 1985); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 1 do not agree that these decisions say that there
is any such presumption, but, to the extent they do, they are based on misreadings of Foster and
Head Money Cases and are erroneous for the reasons set forth in the text. The other decision that
the government cited to support its supposed general presumption, Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989), cannot by any stretch be read to support any
such presumption.
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stitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of
any legislative provision. 67
Foster thus reaffirms that the Supremacy Clause rejects the British
rule, gives all treaties the status of domestic law, and establishes as the
general rule in this country that treaties do not require implementation
by the legislature before they may be applied by the courts.
Marshall did say that a treaty is to be regarded by the courts of
justice as the equivalent of an act of legislation only if it "operates of
itself, without the aid of any legislative provision." This qualification is
the source of the "confounding" 8 doctrine of self-executing treaties. To
the extent the terms self-executing and non-self-executing can be said
to be terms of art as applied to treaties, they refer to the distinction
Marshall drew in Foster. But Foster does not stand for the proposition
that a treaty that does not operate of itself is not the law of the land. If
a negative inference is to be drawn from Marshall's statement, the em-
phasis must be on the words "to be regarded in the courts of justice."
Marshall's words must be understood as a statement that non-self-exe-
cuting treaties, though the law of the land, nevertheless must be imple-
mented by Congress because the obligation they impose is an obligation
to accomplish certain ends through domestic legislation. Foster held
that such an obligation is one that, in our constitutional system of sepa-
rated powers, is for the legislature, not the courts, to perform.69
Foster involved a treaty stipulating that certain "grants shall be rati-
fied and confirmed to the persons in possession [of the lands.]"' 70 In
determining whether the provision "operate[d] of itself, without the aid
of any legislative provision," Marshall framed the issue as follows: "Do
these words act directly on the grants, so as to give validity to those not
otherwise valid? or do they pledge the faith of the United States to
pass acts which shall ratify and confirm [the grants] ?",71 The issue was
thus one of treaty interpretation, governed by the words of the provi-
sion, and the relevant question was whether those words "ratified and
confirmed" the grants themselves or instead obligated the United
States to "pass acts" to "ratify and confirm" the grants in the future.
The Court read the "shall be ratified" language as contemplating a
future act of ratification, but it said that its decision would have been
different if the provision had said that the grants were "hereby" rati-
67. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (emphasis added).
68. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 44 U.S. 832 (1979).
69. See infra note 75.
70. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315.
71. Id. at 314.
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fled and confirmed. 2
That the issue was whether the treaty affirmatively contemplated a
future act of ratification, and that this was a matter of treaty interpre-
tation, were confirmed five years later in United States v. Perchenan, 
7
in which the Court reversed itself and held that the treaty involved in
Foster was indeed self-executing. The Court's about-face on this point
was the result of its review of the Spanish text, which provided that the
grants "shall remain ratified and confirmed ... ." These words, the
Court held, denoted that the grants were ratified and confirmed "by
force of the instrument itself"; the treaty did not, as the Court had
previously concluded, "stipulatle] for some future legislative act."7"
Foster and Percheman thus establish that, although treaties in the
United States do not as a general matter require legislative implemen-
tation before they may be applied by the courts, this rule may be modi-
fied by the parties through the treaty itself.75 The obligations the par-
ties undertake in the treaty remain the law of the land, but if the
obligation is one to accomplish certain ends in the future through legis-
lation, then our courts may not treat the end as having been accom-
plished until the legislation is enacted."6 The distinction recognized in
these two cases was thus a distinction between a treaty that established
an international obligation to "pass acts" accomplishing a certain
end-a treaty that affirmatively "stipulates for some future legislative
act"-and a treaty that purports of its own force to establish the obli-
gation the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Article 33 would have fallen within
Marshall's category of non-self-executing treaty if, instead of itself
prohibiting the return of refugees, it had provided, in substance, that
the contracting parties "shall enact laws prohibiting the return of refu-
72. Id.
* 73. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
74. Id. at 88-89. It is noteworthy that the so-called doctrine of self-executing treaties, which
has so confounded the courts, has been constructed around a decision that the Court quickly
thereafter concluded was wrongly decided.
75. This conclusion was not as self-evident as Marshall made it out to be. Just as treaties in
Great Britain require implementing legislation regardless of what the parties intended, the Court
could have held in Foster that, in light of the Supremacy Clause, treaties in the United States do
not require implementing legislation even if the parties intended to require it. In other words, it
could have held that the rule that legislation is not required is not one that may be reversed by
agreement. Underlying the Court's holding that legislation is required when the parties affirma-
tively so agree, therefore, is an unarticulated holding about our domestic separation of powers; the
case was not disposed of, as Marshall seemed to suggest (and perhaps believe), by the parties'
agreement. Nevertheless, after the Court's domestic separation-of-powers holding in Foster, it
may be said that legislation is required if the parties intended to require legislation.
76. The test differs from the power-conferring theory discussed above in that (a) the default
rule remains that no legislation is required, and (b) a stipulation of the parties to the treaty, not
the unilateral intent of the United States treaty-makers, is necessary to reverse the rule. By focus-
sing on what the parties agreed to (as opposed to what the United States treaty-makers unilater-
ally intended) the Foster rule is faithful to the Supremacy Clause, which conformed our interna-
tional treaty obligations with our domestic law. The power-conferring theory, by contrast, would
create a discrepancy between our international obligation and our domestic law.
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gees to a place where they would be persecuted."
The decision on which the district court and the government relied in
McNary, the Second Circuit's decision in Bertrand v. Sava,"' appar-
ently concluded that Article 33 established the latter obligation. Not-
withstanding the provision's clear prohibitory language, the court con-
cluded that Article 33 does not itself obligate the United States not to
return refugees to a countries where they would be persecuted, but in-
stead obligates the United States to "adjust" its domestic law to pro-
hibit the return of refugees to such countries..7 For this proposition, the
court relied on its earlier decision in Stevic v. Sava.7 1 What the Second
Circuit had said in Stevic, however, was that, "[s]ince Article 33 of the
Convention imposes an absolute obligation upon the United States,
standards developed in an era of discretionary authority require some
adjustment."8 That does not suggest that the adjustment must be ac-
complished by legislation. As discussed above, it was clearly contem-
plated that, to the extent there was a discrepancy between what ex-
isting federal statutes required and what was required by the Protocol,
United States officials would give effect to the Protocol's requirements
as law within the framework of then-existing statUtes-i.e., without
legislation. Executive and judicial officials were to adjust their stan-
dards without legislative action because the treaty itself so required.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the obligation im-
posed by Article 33 is not an obligation to "pass acts" prohibiting the
return of refugees to countries where they would be persecuted; rather,
Article 33 itself, of its own force, "imposed a mandatory duty on con-
tracting States not to return an alien to a country where his 'life or
freedom would be threatened' on account of one of the enumerated rea-
sons."8" Bertrand accordingly did not survive the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca.
Even if the issue had not already been resolved by the Supreme
Court, the conclusion that Article 33 itself prohibits the return of refu-
gees would be inescapable. The terms of Article 33 simply cannot be
construed to require legislation. Furthermore, numerous statements of
executive branch officials at the time of the Protocol's transmission to
the Senate for its advice and consent show that Article 33 itself was
understood to impose an immediate obligation on the United States not
to deliver refugees to their persecutors, and to confer a correlative right
upon refugees. In transmitting the Protocol to the Senate for its advice
77. 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 218.
79. 678 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom, INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1983).
80. 467 U.S. at 406.
81. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 (footnote omitted); see also Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429
n.22 (Article 33 gives refugees "right" and "entitlement.").
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and consent, President Johnson described the Protocol as "a compre-
hensive Bill of Rights for refugees fleeing their country because of per-
secution on account of their political views, race, religion, nationality,
or social ties.""2 These and numerous other references in the legislative
history to the "rights" 83 created by the Protocol plainly establish the
understanding of the United States that the Protocol conferred sub-
stantive rights directly on refugees. President Johnson's statement ex-
plicitly recognizes that "[floremost among the humanitarian rights
which the Protocol provides is the prohibition against expulsion or re-
turn of refugees to any country where they would face persecution." '84
This "foremost . . . right" guaranteed by the Protocol is precisely the
"right" embodied in Article 33.86 In light of these statements, it cannot
be maintained that Article 33 "stipulated for some future legislative
act."
The government argued in McNary that Article III of the Protocol is
such a stipulation. Article III requires the contracting states to "com-
municate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and
regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application- of the pre-
sent Protocol." This provision does not support the government's con-
clusion for two reasons. First, as the government acknowledged in Mc-
Nary, in many countries treaties never have domestic legal force. 86 In
such countries, treaties always require implementing legislation. Article
III's reference to "laws [the contracting parties] may adopt" may thus
simply be a reference to the laws adopted by states that require legisla-
tion in all circumstances. It does not suggest that the parties contem-
plated legislation by states that give treaties automatic domestic legal
force. In fact, Article III's use of the permissive verb "may" indicates
that the parties did not in fact intend affirmatively to require legisla-
tion, but meant merely to require that legislation enacted by countries
whose domestic constitutions require implementing legislation be com-
municated to the Secretary General. Second, the Protocol incorporates
82. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. III (1968) (emphasis added).
83. See Letter of Submittal of the Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson regarding
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. V (1968) ("[The
Refugee Convention] constituted the most comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees so
far attempted on an international level.") (emphasis added); S, REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1968) (testimony of Lawrence A. Dawson, Acting Deputy Director, Officer of Refugee and
Migration Affairs) ("The Protocol is a human rights document.") (emphasis added); id. at 6
("[T]he Protocol deals entirely in the sphere of standards of protection and rights for refugees.")
(emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. See also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428-29 n.22 (1984) (Article 33 gave refugees a
"right" and "entitlement" not to be returned to a country where they would be persecuted).
86. Defendants' Opposition to the Entry of Injunctive Relief at 26, Haitian Ctrs. Council v.
McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
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provisions that appear to contemplate legislation even in countries, such
as the United States, in which treaties have automatic domestic legal
force. Article 34, for example, was described by the Court in Stevic as
"precatory and not self-executing."87 Article III's reference to "laws
[the contracting parties] may adopt" may thus also be a reference to
laws giving effect to the provisions, such as Article 34, that leave the
parties with discretion regarding the manner of achieving those provi-
sions' aspirations. In light of these two possibilities, Article III simply
does not support an inference that, despite Article 33's clear prohibi-
tory language, the provision actually imposes an obligation to pass acts
to prohibit the return of refugees to countries where they would be
persecuted.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court decision in Haitian Ref-
ugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey,88 relied on by the government in McNary,
is simply wrong.8 9 The Postal decision does not support the govern-
ment's reliance on Article I1. The provisions the Postal court was re-
ferring to provided that "/e]very State shall take the necessary legisla-
tive measures" to achieve certain ends.90 They thus appeared to
contemplate the enactment of legislation on the part of every
party-whereas here the Protocol simply requires parties to inform the
United Nations of the laws they "may" enact, thus acknowledging that
legislation may not be required in some countries. Moreover, in Postal
the quoted language appeared in each of the provisions to which the
court referred, suggesting that each such provision was non-self-execut-
ing, whereas Article 33 is not accompanied by any such implementa-
tion rider.91 The court said in Postal that "[siuch provisions are uni-
formly declared executory."9 It is obviously a very different matter to
conclude that a single provision in a treaty requiring the parties to
notify a depository of legislation they may enact renders every provi-
sion of the treaty executory. 93
87. 467 U.S. at 429 n.22.
88. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1985); afld on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
89. Judge Bork's solitary concurrence in Tel-Oren is similarly flawed.
90. 589 F.2d at 876 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
91. Even the provision involved in Postal does not necessarily signify that the parties intended
to require legislation. The court in Postal held that the provision was not self-executing because it
contemplated the enactment of legislation. But the provision contemplates the enactment of legis-
lation only if "necessary" to achieve the provision's ends. In light of the supremacy clause and
Foster, legislation is not "necessary" in the United States unless the treaty affirmatively so stipu-
lates. Because the provision involved in Postal does not tell us that legislation is necessary, its
reference to "legislative measures" does not support a conclusion that the provision is not "self-
executing."
92. 589 F.2d at 876-77 (emphasis added).
93. The Gracey court's paraphrase of Postal demonstrates its error. In holding that Article III
of the Protocol rendered the entire Protocol non-self-executing, the Gracey court quoted Postal for
the proposition that "treaties with '[sluch provisions are uniformly declared executory.'" How-
ever, the words "treaties with" do not appear in Postal. The Gracey court thus fundamentally
19931
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In sum, the Supreme Court's prior decisions and the statements of
the Executive upon transmitting the Protocol to the Senate for its ad-
vice and consent confirm what the plain text of Article 33 leaves no
room to doubt: the provision itself imposes an immediately effective ob-
ligation not to deliver refugees into the hands of their persecutors. It
does not impose an obligation to take steps in the future to prohibit the
return of refugees to their persecutors. It is accordingly "self-execut-
ing" in the sense contemplated in Foster and Percheman. (Indeed, to
conclude that Article 33 is not self-executing in the Foster sense would
be to conclude that we have failed in the past twenty-five years to carry
out our solemn obligation to enact legislation to confer a nonrefoule-
ment right on refugees on the high seas (assuming, as we must for
purposes of examining the self-executing issue, that Article 33 applies
to such refugees while the Refugee Act does not).)
IV. ARTICLE 33 ESTABLISHES JUSTICIABLE OBLIGATIONS
Dicta in the Supreme Court's more recent decisions suggest that a
treaty may have to be implemented by legislation before it may be en-
forced in court even if the parties did not specifically agree that legisla-
tion would be required. In Stevic, the Supreme Court said that Article
34 of the Convention was not self-executing because its language was
"precatory." 94 In the Head Money Cases, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that a treaty is not enforceable in court by individuals unless it
"prescribe[s] a rule by which the rights of [individuals] may be deter-
mined".9 5 These tests differ from that of Foster and Percheman in that
they do not turn on an intent to require legislation. Instead, they reflect
the view that certain rules are, under our system of separated powers,
not for the courts to enforce.
Although the courts often describe a treaty that is not judicially en-
forceable on these grounds as "non-self-executing," these grounds of
unenforceability are not unique to treaties. A statute that is "preca-
tory" is similarly unenforceable in court-it does not impose a duty on
the defendant."6 A statute that does not prescribe a rule by which the
altered the statement it purported to be quoting.
94. 467 U.S. at 429 n.22 (holding that Article 34 of the Convention is "precatory and not self-
executing.").
95. 112 U.S. at 598-99. See also People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d
90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The government
erroneously cited the Head Money Cases for the proposition that a treaty is enforceable in the
courts by private parties only if the parties to the treaty intended that the rights established by the
treaty be enforceable in court. This fundamentally misreads the Supreme Court's dictum, which
establishes only that a treaty may not be enforced in court if the duty it imposes is not one that is
amendable to judicial application. Head Money Cases does not even remotely say that the issue
turns on the intent of the parties or of the U.S. treaty-makers concerning judicial enforceability.
96. Cf Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981); see generally
Vdzquez, supra note 19, at 1124.
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rights of the plaintiff may be determined is unenforceable in court be-
cause the duty it establishes is insufficiently determinate to be justicia-
ble.97 A treaty that shares these characteristics is unenforceable in
court for the familiar reason that courts exist, solely, to enforce the
rights of individuals.98 Ifa treaty or a statute does not impose a "duty"
on the defendant, either because it is precatory or because what it re-
quires of the defendant is insufficiently spelled out, it does not give the
plaintiff a correlative right.
Article 33 is clearly "self-executing" in this sense. As the Supreme
Court has found, Article 33's nonrefoulement obligation is not preca-
tory but "mandatory."'99 Nor can it be argued that the nonrefoulement
obligation does not "prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private
citizen or subject may be determined." 00 The unambiguous, prohibi-
tory rule embodied in Article 33 is certainly amenable to judicial appli-
cation without further expostulation by statute. The Supreme Court
had no difficulty discerning the content of Article 33's nonrefoulement
obligation in Stevic, 01 and the government routinely enforces it with
respect to refugees who have reached our shores.
The Supreme Court's discussion in Stevic of Articles 33 and 34 of
the Convention illustrates the proper application of this test for deter-
mining whether a treaty provision is "self-executing," and confirms
that Article 33 is self-executing. Article 34 provides in full as follows:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the as-
similation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular
make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to
reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings. "102
Because of its "precatory" language, its express contemplation of fu-
ture affirmative acts, and its ambiguity concerning what is required,
Article 34 is exactly the kind of treaty provision that has always been
thought to be unenforceable in court without legislative fleshing out,
and the Supreme Court accordingly so held in Stevic.105 By contrast,
because it imposes a clear, unambiguous and immediately effective ob-
ligation and establishes correlative rights of individuals, Article 33 is
97. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (lack of"judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards" reduces likelihood that legal provision will be enforceable in court).
98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
99. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987).
100. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
101. Indeed, the Court in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca relied on Article 33's text and history
in interpreting the corresponding provision of the Refugee Act.
102. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 34 (emphasis added).
103. 467 U.S. at 428-29 n.22. For another example, see Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 n.2
(Cal. 1952), discussed in Viizquez, supra note 19, at 1123 & n.150.
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exactly the type of provision that has consistently been considered self-
executing. Thus, in the very same discussion referred to above, the Su-
preme Court in Stevic expressly recognized that Article 33 conferred
upon refugees a "right ... to avoid deportation," a right that the refu-
gee himself could "assert" in adjudication and that the Attorney Gen-
eral was required to "implement." 10 " A provision that confers a right is
the very opposite of a provision that is precatory or otherwise not judi-
cially enforceable.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which an immedi-
ately effective, mandatory treaty obligation not to perform a well-de-
fined act would require legislative implementation. As the court said in
Commonwealth v. Hawes, °6 a decision characterized as "very able" by
the author of Head Money Cases in an opinion for the Court two years
later: 06
When it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be done,
or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded
or exceeded by the contracting parties, the compact does not need
to be supplemented by legislative or executive action, to authorize
the courts of justice to decline to override those limitations or to
exceed the prescribed restrictions, for the palpable and all-suffi-
cient reason, that to do so would be not only to violate the public
faith, but to transgress the "supreme law of the land." ' 7
When the obligation is prohibitory, unambiguous, and immediately ef-
fective, congressional "implementation" would simply repeat the prohi-
bition and emphasize that "we mean it." The Supremacy Clause dis-
penses with the need for such embellishment." 8
104. 467 U.S. at 428-29 n.22.
105. 6 Ky. (13 Bush) 697 (1878).
106. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 428 (1886). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987).
107. 6 Ky. (13 Bush) at 702-03.
108. The government argued in McNary that Article 33 was not self-executing precisely be-
cause Congress engaged in such embellishment by enacting the Refugee Act of 1980. But, as the
Supreme Court has already recognized, the Refugee Act's amendments to the withholding-of-
deportation provision were made "for the sake of clarity." See supra note 59 and accompanying
text. Moreover, "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier one." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983)(quoting Jefferson
County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 165 n.27 (1983), which in
turn quoted United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). The views of a subsequent Con-
gress are obviously an even more hazardous basis for inferring the meaning of an earlier treaty.
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V. ARTICLE 33 MAY BE ENFORCED JUDICIALLY EVEN IF IT DOES
NOT CONFER A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The government also argued in McNary that Article 33 was non-
self-executing in a very different sense than those described above. It
contended that Article 33 is not self-executing because it does not itself
establish a private right of action. The government argued that a treaty
must be self-executing in this sense in order to be enforced by an indi-
vidual in a court: "[A]n individual can enforce a treaty in court only to
the extent that the treaty provides a directly enforceable private right
of action."109
The quoted statement is insupportable. Although a treaty that does
not itself confer a right of action may be described as not "self-execut-
ing" in respect to.remedies, 10 a treaty may be enforced by individuals
in court even if it is not self-executing in this sense. If there is another
source for the plaintiff's right of action, a treaty may be enforceable in
court as long as it is self-executing in the sense that it itself establishes
the defendant's obligation to behave in a given way towards the plain-
tiff-in other words, if it establishes the defendant's primary obligation
and the plaintiff's correlative primary right."' As shown above, Article
33 plainly is self-executing in the sense that it itself establishes the
United States' obligation not to return refugees to a country in which
they would be persecuted, and the refugees' correlative right not to be
returned.
In numerous treaty cases, the right of action was conferred not by
the treaty itself, but by the common law; the treaty merely established
the defendant's duty (and the plaintiff's correlative right). " 2 In other
109. Defendants' Opposition to Entry of Injunctive Relief at 25, Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Mc-
Nary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
110. Cf. Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1991) (asking
whether constitution may be said to be self-executing in regard to remedies). See generally Viz-
quez, supra note 19, at 1117-19.
111. The distinction between a right and a right of action is a familiar, if often overlooked,
one. The Supreme Court has held that,
"[iln determining whether a federal right has been violated, we have considered [1]
whether the provision in question creates obligations binding on the governmental unit or
rather 'does no more than express a congressional preference for all certain kinds of treat-
ment.' [2] The interest the plaintiff asserts must not be 'too vague and amorphous' to be
'beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.' [3] We have also asked whether the
provision in question was 'intend[edl to benefit' the putative plaintiff."
Dennis v. Higgins, Il1 S.Ct. 865, 871 (1991). If there is a "right," the right of action may be
conferred by, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal
Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233 (1991) (distinguish-
ing between "primary rights" and "remedial rights."). The first two characteristics of a "right"
listed above are easily met by Article 33 for the reasons set forth above. The third is more prop-
erly conceived as a standing requirement. Clearly, Article 33 was "intended to benefit" refugees.
112. See, e.g., Florida v. Furman, 180 U.S. 402 (1901) (action to remove cloud on legal title);
Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 243 (1889) (ejectment); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
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cases, the right of action was conferred by federal or state statute. 1 3
The plaintiffs in McNary relied on the APA for their right of action."1 "
The APA provides a right of action for declaratory and injunctive relief
to persons suffering "legal wrong" as a result of federal agency ac-
tion. 10 Because Article 33 is the law of the land, agency action that
violates that provision inflicts a "legal wrong" and entitles persons "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by such action" to judicial review
thereof.116 A person has standing to pursue an APA action if he or she
is within the "'zone of interests' sought to be protected" by the Article
33.117
The APA right of action is unavailable if "statutes preclude judicial
review" or if the challenged action is committed to agency discretion
by law.118 The second exception is inapplicable here, however, because
Article 33 removes any discretion that the Attorney General may have
previously enjoyed to turn refugees over to their persecutors. The gov-
ernment argued in McNary that the Immigration and Nationality Act
is a statute precluding judicial review under the APA of an Article 33
nonrefoulement claim. 1 9 I do not examine this claim here, except to
observe that a right of action to enforce a law is presumptively availa-
ble under the APA even if the law itself does not include a "separate
indication of . . . an intent to make agency action reviewable under
483 (1879) (action "pursuant to a law of the State"); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453,
462-63 (1819) (bill in equity); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 277 (1817) (ejectment);
Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 300, 303 (1816) (same); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 255 (1829) (same); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256 (1795) (action in debt). See
also Vfzquez, supra note 19, at 1144 & nn.256-58.
113. See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (habeas corpus action based on
treaty provision); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (state action for injunction); Jordan v.
Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) (state mandamus action).
114. The self-execution decisions in which the court considered whether the treaty conferred a
right of action were cases in which the plaintiff sought damages against private parties. See, e.g.,
Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d at 26. The APA thus
did not supply a right of action, and the court could discern no other basis for the right of action.
Under such circumstances, it is appropriate for the court to consider whether the treaty confers
the right of action. But the treaty need not confer a right of action if the plaintiff seeks declara-
tory or injunctive relief against federal officials. The right of action in such cases is furnished by
the APA.
115. See Japan Whaling, Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). The APA affords a right of action to challenge agency action
that is unlawful because it violates a treaty. See Vdzquez, supra note 19, at 1147-48. Indeed, the
government conceded in Baker that, "assuming that Article 33 imposes the obligations plaintiffs
assert and were 'self-executing' in some broader sense, the current action for injunctive relief
could ... proceed as an APA action, and would therefore be subject to APA limitations." Reply
Brief for Appellants at 18 n.22, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (1lth Cir.
1991)(No. 91-6060), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
117. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990)(citation omitted).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1977 & Supp. 1992).
119. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 59-60, Haitian Cts. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350
(2d Cir.)(No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)(No.93-344)(arguing that the INA is
a "statute preclud[ing] judicial review" under the APA of a claim by a refugee who is not "physi-
cally present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry.").
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the APA," and that this presumption can be overcome only by "clear
and convincing legislative intent to preclude review." 110 For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the question whether plaintiffs
have a right of action is distinct from the question whether Article 33
is judicially enforceable,' and that a right of action to enforce a
treaty need not have its source in the treaty itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States government has long been arguing in the courts
that the nonrefoulement obligation embodied in Article 33, the core
obligation assumed by the United States when it ratified the Refugee
Protocol,12 2 is not judicially enforceable because it is not self-executing.
Contrary to the government's contention, Article 33 is the "supreme
Law of the Land" by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and it imposes
an immediately effective, well-defined obligation not to return refugees
to their persecutors. Our accession to the Protocol in 1968 itself had
the effect of prohibiting the Attorney General (and all other govern-
ment officials in this country) from returning refugees to their persecu-
tors. Article 33 thus gave'refugees a correlative "right" and "entitle-
ment" not to be so returned. This right is perfectly susceptible to
judicial enforcement. A person seeking to enforce Article 33 affirma-
tively must of course possess a right of action, but the right of action
may be conferred by statutes or the common law, state or federal. It
need not be conferred by the treaty itself. In the absence of a "clear
and convincing legislative intent to preclude [judicial] review,"12 3 the
APA would confer a right of action for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief to enforce Article 33.
It bears emphasizing, however, that a conclusion that Article 33 is
not self-executing (in any of the senses discussed in this Article) is not
a conclusion that the policy embodied in the Kennebunkport Order is
legal. It is merely a conclusion that the courts may not intervene to
stop a violation of our international treaty obligation.
120. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). See
also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
121. For example, even if the APA right of action were not available to enforce Article 33
against federal officials, § 1983 would be available to enforce the provision against state officials.
Thus, if a state official were to return a refugee to his persecutors, the refugee would have a right
of action under § 1983 for damages, as well as injunctive or declaratory relief, as long as Article
33 is self-executing in the respects discussed in Sections II-IV, supra. Section 1983 confers a right
of action for damages and injunctive relief on persons deprived of their treaty rights by state
officials. See generally Vizquez, supra note 19, at 1146-47.
122. See Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1983).
123. See supra note 120.
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